Do State Fiscal Policies Affect State Economic Growth? by James Alm & Janet Rogers
Tulane Economics Working Paper Series







Department of Planning Section
Division of Budget & Planning






What factors inuence state economic growth? This paper uses annual state (and local) data for the
years 1947 to 1997 for the 48 contiguous states to estimate the eects of a large number of factors,
including taxation and expenditure policies, on state economic growth. A special feature of the empirical
work is the use of orthogonal distance regression (ODR) to deal with the likely presence of measurement
error in many of the variables. The results indicate that the correlation between state (and state and
local) taxation policies is often statistically signicant but also quite sensitive to the specic regressor
set and time period; in contrast, the eects of expenditure policies are much more consistent. Of
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presence of measurement error in many of the variables.  The results indicate that the correlation 
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policies are much more consistent.  Of some interest, there is moderately strong evidence that a 
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estimation results do not support conditional convergence in state per capita income. 
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1. Introduction 
The average annual growth rates of per capita income for the individual 48 contiguous 
U.S. states over the last half of the twentieth century range from 1.73 percent to 3.15 percent.  
Six states have annual growth rates that exceed the national growth rate by more one-half of a 
percentage point at least half the time.  Another four states have annual growth rates that are 
more than one-half of a percentage point less than the national growth rate at least half the time.  
Figure 1 identifies the states with the highest and the lowest average growth rates. 
Why is this issue important?  In 1947 the median real value of per capita income for the 
48 contiguous states was just under $7,500 (in 1997 dollars).  If, over the 50 year period from 
1947 to 1997 the annual growth rate had been 1.73 percent – the smallest average state growth 
rate observed for the period – then the median 1947 value of real per capita income would have 
increased to approximately $17,700, or by nearly 235 percent.  In contrast, if the annual growth 
rate had been 3.15 percent (or the highest observed average growth rate), then this same initial 
income would have increased by more than 470 percent, to $35,400.  Small changes in growth 
rates compound over 50 years to very large differences in per capita incomes.  It is therefore 
imperative to understand the processes that cause the individual states to show such variations in 
their annual growth rates. 
Many factors that influence economic growth, such as climate, proximity to national 
markets, and energy costs, cannot be changed by state (or national) government policy.  Still 
other factors like labor force skills can only be changed by government in the long run.  This 
leaves fiscal policies – tax and expenditures – as one of the primary means (along with 
regulations and legal considerations) available to state governments for accelerating economic 
growth in the short run. 2 
 
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the effects of various tax and expenditure policies 
on state per capita income growth, in order to determine whether there are public policies that 
foster higher or lower growth rates.  We use annual state (and local) data for the years 1947 to 
1997 for the 48 contiguous states to estimate the effects of a wide variety of factors, including 
taxation and expenditure policies, on state economic growth.  A special feature of our empirical 
work is the use of orthogonal distance regression (ODR) to deal with the likely presence of 
measurement error in some variables.  Our contributions are several: we examine a longer period 
of time than most other studies, we include a more comprehensive collection of explanatory 
variables, and our use of ODR methods allows us to address the measurement errors that are 
inherent in empirical growth studies. 
Our results indicate that state economic policies matter, but not always in ways suggested 
by some previous work.  For example, the correlation between state (and state and local) taxation 
policies is often statistically significant but is also quite sensitive to the specific regressor set and 
time period.  In contrast, the effects of expenditure policies are much more consistent.  Of some 
interest also, there is moderately strong evidence that a state’s political orientation, as indicated 
by such variables as the political party of the governor and the presence of tax and expenditure 
limitations, has consistent and measurable effects on per capita income growth rates.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, a more “conservative” political orientation is associated with lower rates of 
economic growth.  Finally, although traditional estimation methods suggest conditional 
convergence in state per capita income, our ODR results that correct for measurement error do 
not support convergence. 3 
 
In the next section we briefly discuss the economic growth literature.  In section 3 we 
present our empirical strategy, and we also discuss our data.  We then discuss our estimation 
results.  In section 5, we summarize our main results and their implications. 
 
2. A Selective Review of the Economic Growth Literature 
  Building upon the exogenous growth models of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), and the 
endogenous growth models of Romer (1987, 1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), among 
others, there are many empirical studies that attempt to estimate the determinates of economic 
growth.  Many of these studies examine the growth experience at the country level (e.g., the 
“cross-country approach”).  Of more relevance here, some work has focused on the growth 
experiences of the U.S. states (the “cross-region approach”).  See Weil (2005) for a recent survey 
of much of this literature. 
The standard approach begins by defining the relationship between per capita income in 
successive periods as: 
  ys,t+1 = ys,t (1 + gs,t),                  (1) 
where ys,t is per capita income of state s in period t (and similarly for period t+1) and gs,t is the 
growth rate of per capita income of state s over the period t to period t+1.  Applying a 
logarithmic transformation to equation (1), a linear regression model is obtained as: 
  gs,t = βx xs,t + εγ s,t ,                  (2) 
where xs,t is a vector of explanatory variables for state s in period t (including regional and 
geographic characteristics of state s that are constant over time, national characteristics in year t 
that do not vary by state, and other variables that vary both by state s and year t), βx is a vector of 4 
 
coefficients, and εγ s,t is the model error term for state s in period t.  Equation (2) is then 
estimated by various estimation methods, typically ordinary linear least squares (LLS) methods. 
  Researchers have used a wide range of explanatory variables in their cross-regional 
studies.  For example, Canto and Webb (1987) present a non-pooled regression of cross-region 
annual U.S. data for the period 1957 through 1977.  Their independent variable is the average 




tax burden.  Similarly, Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1989) compare U.S. state per capita incomes 
as a percent of average state per capita income and overall state income inequality with regional 
variables that indicate coastal, energy-production, sun-belt, and “farm-crises” states.  Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1991) examine cross-region data for the U.S. states using various sub-intervals for 
the period 1840 through 1985.  They regress the average growth rate against initial income, three 
regional specifications (South, Midwest, West), and employment composition for nine industrial 
sectors.  For some other cross-region studies, see Berry and Kaserman (1987), Mofidi and Stone 
(1990), Yu, Wallace, and Nardinelli (1991), Mullen and Williams (1994), and Phillips and Goss 
(1995).  More recently, Crain and Lee (1999), Caselli and Coleman (2001), Akai and Sakata 
(2002), Garofalo and Yamarik (2002), and Tomljanovich (2004), and Holcombe and Lacombe 
(2004) conduct similar analyses, with quite mixed results.  In perhaps the most comprehensive 
work to date, Reed (2008a, 2008b) uses five-year data from 1970 to 1999 for the 48 continental 
states, and finds a significant negative relationship between taxes and state economic growth 
across a wide range of specifications and estimation procedures. 5 
 
  These growth regressions have produced a variety of results, and only modest 
consistency.  A similar lack of consensus exists in cross-country growth regressions.  In a survey 
of this latter work, Levine and Renelt (1992) quantify whether the conclusions from cross-
country studies are robust or fragile when there are small changes to the conditioning 
information set.  Using the extreme bounds analysis of Leamer (1983, 1985), they find that the 
estimation results are quite fragile.  Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) report 
somewhat more optimistic results in cross-country studies by examining an approximation to the 
cumulative distribution function of the estimators. Even so, their results find that only 18 out of 
67 explanatory variables (or only 27 percent) are robustly correlated with measures of economic 
growth.  Crain and Lee (1999) report similar results for cross-region analysis of U.S. states. 
  As for the more specific impact of fiscal policies, the generally held presumption is that 
higher taxes tend to lower economic growth because of their distortionary effects, because they 
tend to discourage the creation of new firms and jobs, and because they inhibit investment.  For 
example, it is widely held that higher income taxes will lower the rate of growth because they 
lower the net return to private investment and make investment activities less attractive.  Even 
so, there is at least some recognition that the government expenditures financed by tax revenues 
might provide superior public services, thereby making a higher-tax area more, not less, 
attractive.  For example, high public spending on infrastructure investment (e.g., transportation, 
communications, education) is generally believed to increase growth rates.  Indeed, Mofidi and 
Stone (1990) find that state economic performance depends upon the interrelationship between 
state taxes and the programs upon which the taxes are spent.  They also find that state and local 
taxes have a negative effect on growth when the revenues are devoted to transfer payments, but 
that expenditures on health, education, and public infrastructure have positive effects on growth. 6 
 
  It should also be noted that public sector “institutions” are also likely to affect economic 
growth.  For example, Persson and Tabellini (1992) outline a theory that relates different 
political incentives and political institutions to growth.  They conclude that income inequality is 
“bad” for growth in democracies, while land concentration is bad for growth everywhere.  
Relatedly, there is much empirical work that suggests that factors such as the number of local 
governments, the presence of tax and expenditure limitations (TELs), and the political 
composition of the governing party affect (and are in turn affected by) fiscal policies. 
  In sum, existing results for the effects of fiscal policies on state economic growth are 
quite variable.  The next section presents our approach to estimating the impacts of fiscal (and 
other) factors on economic growth. 
 
3. Methods, Data, and Specifications 
3.1. Methods 
  The specification of growth regression models is complicated by the likelihood that the 
observed value of per capita income in state s in year t (ys,t) includes an unknown and 
unknowable measurement error εy s,t ; that is, εy s,t denotes any random disturbance in the 
observed value of per capita income, so that observed ys,t is related to “true” y
τ
s,t by the 
relationship: 
  ys,t = y
τ
s,t + εy s,t,                  (3) 
where the superscript τ denotes the true but unobservable value that excludes all measurement 
errors.  Consequently, the error term in the resulting growth regression consists of a combination 
of the error term associated with the model εγ s,t  and the error term associated with the 7 
 
measurement error in per capita income εy s,t (which also includes the measurement error in the 
initial period income, or εy s,t0). 
The measurement errors in per capita income arise from several sources.  First, reliable 
measures of price levels or price indices are not always available for individual states for an 
extended time period; however, see Berry, Fording, and Hanson (2000).  The use of the national 
price index, as is employed in all analyses here, could potentially introduce two types of 
measurement error: if relative purchasing power parity does not hold across the states, then the 
growth rates of real per capita income are mismeasured; and, if absolute purchasing power parity 
does not hold, then the levels of real per capita income are mismeasured.  Second, per capita 
values are computed from population values that are likely measured with error.  Third, state 
income should be adjusted for the net inflow of the earnings of wage and salary workers who are 
interstate commuters, and in this adjustment additional errors are likely introduced. 
  There is a large econometric literature on measurement errors and the associated errors-
in-variables problem.  Work that addresses measurement errors in economic growth regressions 
is much sparser (DeLong 1988; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991).  Ordinary linear or nonlinear 
least squares estimation does not address measurement error issues.  In contrast, our preferred 
estimation method corrects for measurement error, and, in the process, generates significant 
improvements in the estimates. 
  In particular, ordinary least squares methods are inappropriate in the presence of errors-
in-variables.  When suitable instruments that are correlated with the explanatory variables but 
uncorrelated with the error terms can be found, the method of instrumental variables is often 
used when such errors are present.  Another procedure is orthogonal distance regression (ODR), 8 
 
which is especially appropriate when the statistical model is nonlinear in the unknown variables 
and when there is some information available about the variance of the measurement error 
(εy s,t ) (including t0) and the size relative to the model error (εγ s,t).  While information about the 
variances is not always readily available, it is often reasonable to assume that the standard 
deviation of the measurement error is the same for all s and t (including t0), and that the standard 
deviation of the model error is also constant over all s and t.  Therefore, it is only necessary to 
make assumptions about the magnitude of the ratio of the standard deviations to obtain the ODR 
solution. 
More precisely, if we assume that the measurement error (εy s,t)  and the model error 
(εγ s,t) in the observation corresponding to state s are independent between observations ti and tj, 
for i≠j, and have known (relative) variance, then we can derive the distribution of the combined 
error εs=[εy s,t ; εγ s,t] for any state s as Ν (0, Ωε s), where 0 denotes a conformably dimensioned 
array of zeros and Ωε s denotes the covariance matrix for all model and measurement errors 
associated with state s.  As a result, asymptotically maximum likelihood estimators can be 
obtained employing ODR.  Unlike LLS methods, which minimize the sum of the squared 
vertical deviations between the dependent variable and the fitted “line”, ODR methods minimize 
the orthogonal (or perpendicular) deviations from the fitted line. See Boggs, Bryd, and Schnabel 
(1987) and Boggs, Donaldson, Schnabel, and Spiegelman (1988) for detailed discussions of 
ODR methods, including an algorithm that can be used to calculate ODR coefficient estimates.  
In fact, we use weighted ODR methods, which allow for heteroscedastic variances within and 
between and observations, for nonzero covariances within observations (even though covariances 
between observations are identically zero), and for nonlinearity in the explanatory variables 
and/or the estimated coefficients. 9 
 
Monte Carlo experiments that we have conducted show that measurement errors do in 
fact significantly affect LLS estimates from growth regressions.  These experiments also show 
that ODR methods noticeably improve bias and mean square error results, even when the 
assumptions imposed on the solution are wrong.  In particular, the results show that LLS 
estimates designed to test the “convergence hypothesis” have a strong tendency to be more 
negatively biased than the same coefficient estimated using ODR methods.  Furthermore, for all 
but one of the more than 80 pairs of median bias examined in our Monte Carlo study, the bias in 
the LLS estimator is larger than that in the ODR estimator by more than a factor of 2.  These 
experiments demonstrate that the measurement errors inherent in growth regression data are 
important, and should be considered explicitly when attempting to analyze the factors that affect 
economic growth.  All of our Monte Carlo results are available upon request. 
3.2. Data 
  Response Variable.  The response variable in our basic specifications is the annual 
growth rate in per capita personal income for the 48 contiguous states over the period 1947 to 
1997.  Personal income is computed by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic 
Analysis as the sum of wages and salaries, other labor income, proprietors’ income, dividends, 
interest, rent, and transfer payments, less personal contributions for social insurance.  The main 
difference between state personal income and gross state product involves the treatment of 
capital income.  Personal income includes corporate net income only when individuals receive 
payment as dividends; gross state product includes corporate profits and depreciation.  Also, 
gross state product attributes capital income to the state in which the business activity occurs, 
while personal income attributes capital income to the state of the asset holder.  Neither measure 
includes capital gains. 10 
 
  The personal income of a state is defined as the income received by the residents of the 
state.  However, the estimates of wages and salaries, other labor income, and personal 
contributions for social insurance are based mainly on source data that are reported by place of 
work, not by place of residence.  Accordingly, an adjustment for residence, equal to the net 
inflow of the earnings of wage and salary workers who are interstate commuters, must be 
estimated so that the place-of-residence measures of earnings and personal income can be 
derived.  Descriptive statistics for the resulting growth rates in per capita income data are 
provided in Table 1. 
  Explanatory Variables.  We have assembled more than 130 explanatory variables for 
the analysis.  These variables can be grouped into five categories: revenues, expenditures, 
demographics, geographics, and national.  The first three categories include values that vary by 
state and by year; the fourth includes values that vary by state but not by year; and the fifth 
includes values that vary by year but not by state.  All variables in each category are identified in 
Tables 2 through 6.  Note that the first two letters of each variable name denote the category 
(e.g., rv for revenues, sp for spending or expenditures, dm for demographics, ge for geographics, 
and us for national). 
  The revenue and expenditure variables are of obvious interest to policy makers.  The 
various tax sources (e.g., individual or corporate income, sales, and property taxes) have 
implications for the returns to individuals and firms from their activities.  Similarly, how a state 
chooses to spend these revenues is also important.  For example, expenditures on education can 
have a direct impact on growth by producing a more capable work force, and are also likely to 
have an indirect effect related to the perception of the importance that the state places on 
education. 11 
 
  The revenue, expenditure, demographic, and geographic variables have been recorded at 
a relatively fine level of detail.  Composite variables have then been constructed from these 
values.  For example, the data include values for general and select sales taxes (variables 
rvTXSALgen and rvTXSALsel, respectively), as well as total sales taxes (variable rvTXSALtot) 
computed from their sum.  Similarly, the geographic category includes dummy variables to 
indicate natural resources in the state (such as variables geMNau, geMNfe, and geMNcoal), as 
well as a dummy variable to indicate the occurrence of one or more of these resources (variable 
geMN).  The revenue and expenditure variables are included either as per capita values, as a 
percent of per capita income, or as a percent of total tax revenue.  All explanatory variables are 
lagged one year. 
  Annual values for state revenues and expenditures, as well as for all demographic, 
geographic, and national variables, are available for the period 1947 through 1997.  Annual 
estimates for total state plus local revenues and expenditures are not recorded prior to 1959 (and 
not all variables are available until 1977); as a result, our combined state and local analysis is for 
the shorter periods 1959 to 1997 (and 1977 to 1997).  The data are obtained from various issues 
of the Book of the States, the Statistical Abstract of the United States, Current Population 
Reports (Series P60), State Government Finances reports, and the World Almanac; some 
variables are obtained from personal communication with staff at the U.S. Bureau of the Census.  
The primary source for the estimates of total earnings and employment by place of work is the 
ES-202 series from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
3.3. Specifications 
  Baseline Regression.  Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Crain and Lee 
(1999), and others have explored the sensitivity of regression results by comparing outcomes 12 
 
against the results from a set of “core” variables.  However, there is little agreement on which 
variables should be included in the core set of regressors.  For example, Levine and Renelt 
(1992) use the investment share of gross domestic product (GDP), the initial level of real GDP 
per capita, the initial secondary-school enrollment rate, and the average annual rate of population 
growth as the core variables in their cross-country analysis.  Sala-i-Martin (1997) uses the level 
of income, life expectancy, and primary-school enrollment rate as the core variables for his 
cross-country sensitivity analysis. 
In our work, we choose a set of six core regressors, and our baseline regression (denoted 
Regression A) includes only these variables.  These core regressors are: 
  usGRW: the U.S. per capita income growth rate 
  usINF: the U.S. inflation rate 
  usFUELpp: the average U.S. producer price of fuels 
  gePOLstate: a dummy variable equal to 1 if statehood was attained before 1800, and 0 
otherwise 
  geREGcon: a dummy variable indicating whether the state is one of the contiguous 48 
states (e.g., the constant term in the regression) 
  ys,t0: the value of per capita income for state s in year t0. 
 
These variables are selected for several reasons.  The value of per capita income for state s in 
year t0 (ys,t0) is typically included in growth regressions to test the convergence hypothesis, or the 
notion that a state with a lower initial level of per capita income will experience a higher growth 
rate.  If states experience convergence, then the sign of the estimated coefficient would be 
negative.  The geographic variable gePOLstate designates the “age” of the states, old versus 
new, and could account for differences in growth rates due to the “maturity” of the state.  The 
other geographic variable (or geREGcon) is the constant term of the regression. 
The remaining three core variables are national variables.  The variable usGRW specifies 
the annual real U.S. per capita income growth rate.  It is well-known that growth equations may 
be seriously affected by omitted variables.  To the extent that state per capita income growth 13 
 
rates respond to the same shocks and stimuli as the U.S. growth rate, this variable provides some 
protection against omitted variable bias.  It should also account for much of the business cycle 
component of the states’ growth rates.  Since individual state economies are small relative to the 
U.S. economy as a whole, usGRW is exogenous.  Its coefficient is expected to be roughly one.   
The regressor usINF is the national inflation rate, and its coefficient is expected to be 
negative because inflation is generally presumed to be harmful to economic growth.  The 
variable usFUELpp, which denotes the average national producer price of fuels, is another 
exogenous variable intended to capture the effects of external (fuel) shocks to the U.S. economy. 
The baseline regression is estimated for three time periods: 1947 to 1997, 1959 to 1997, 
and 1977 to 1997.  These correspond, respectively, to the longest period for which annual state 
data are available, the longest period for which state plus local total tax and property tax revenue 
and state and local expenditure values are available, and the longest period for which all state 
plus local tax and expenditure values have been recorded at a relatively fine level of detail.  The 
results from the baseline regression are presented in Appendix Tables, and are discussed in 
section 4.  All regressions correct for first order autocorrelation. 
  Beyond the Baseline Regression.  In addition to the baseline regression, several other 
primary regression specifications are analyzed for the period 1959 to 1997, using each of three 
representations of the fiscal variables (value per capita, value as a percent of income, and value 
as a percent of total tax).  These other primary specifications are denoted Regression B, 
Regression C, and Regression D. 
  Regression B includes the six core variables plus 12 fiscal variables: 
  rvTXTOTAL: the sum of all state plus local taxes 
  rvTXINCcor: corporate income tax revenues 
  rvTXINCind: individual income tax revenues (only available at the local level after 1977) 
  rvTXSALgen: state level general sales tax revenues 14 
 
  rvTXPROP: the sum of state plus local property taxes 
  rvTRFtot: the total amount of revenues transferred from the federal to the state 
government 
  rvTRFedu: the amount of revenues earmarked for education that are transferred from the 
federal to the state government 
  rvTRFhwy: the amount of revenues earmarked for highways that are transferred from the 
federal to the state government 
  spEDUtot: the sum of state plus local expenditures for primary and secondary education, 
including capital construction 
  spHWYtot: the sum of state plus local expenditures for highways, including capital 
construction 
  spWELtot: the sum of state plus local expenditures for welfare 
  spCAPhwy: the sum of state plus local expenditures for capital construction of highways. 
 
(Remember that many of the tax variables are not available at the local level prior to 1977.)  This 
set of variables is assembled to examine the impact of tax, transfer, general expenditure, and 
capital outlay variables. See Tables 2 and 3 for variable definitions. 
  Regression C includes the six core variables from Regression A plus the 12 fiscal 
variables included in Regression B, along with another 30 variables from the demographic, 
geographic, and national variable sets.  This set of variables includes every variable in which 
anyone might reasonably have any interest, plus a few others thrown in for good measure.  These 
variables are defined in Tables 4, 5, and 6.  
  Regression D represents a subset of variables used in Regression C.  It includes the 12 
fiscal variables from Regression B, plus 13 variables selected on the basis of their explanatory 
power.  These 13 variables are: dmPOLgov, dmTXref, dmTXsvl, dmPOP, dmDEN, dmWAGEcv, 
dmPRNFPcv, geHEtotP, geSIZ, geSIZPf, geREGatl, geREGpac, and gePOLCgov.  We believe 
that this variable set is the most representative, and it is the one discussed in greatest detail in 
section 4. 
  Finally, we have also estimated a wide variety of additional specifications.  Regression E 
uses the same regressors and time spans as Regression D, but excludes the five states with the 15 
 
highest variability of growth rates (Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota).  
Regression F has the same explanatory variables and uses the same subset of states as 
Regression E, but the time span is 1977 to 1996 rather than 1959 to 1996.  Regression G is the 
same as Regression F, except that total state plus local fiscal values are used for all tax and 
expenditure variables.  We discuss summary results for these specifications later. 
  Aside from these specifications, it should be noted that we have estimated many 
additional specifications, including ones in which we examine alternative time periods, in which 
we include state plus local measures of all tax and expenditure variables, in which dummy 
variables for the presence (or absence) of specific tax instruments are used rather than their 
values, and in which the growth experience of two individual states (Colorado and Georgia) are 
examined separately.  All results are available upon request. 
 
4. Results 
  Estimation results from some basic specifications are presented in Appendix Tables A1 to 
A7; all other results are available upon request.  The boxes included below summarize the 
outcomes from the regressions.  Column headings within the boxes indicate the time period, the 
fiscal variable parameterization (e.g., per capita, percent of income, percent of total taxes), as 
well as the regression identifier (e.g., A, B, C, D, E, F, or G).  The row headings indicate the 
construction of the fiscal variables: “asl” denotes that all fiscal variables are constructed using 
the sum of state plus local amounts, “psl” denotes that property taxes, total taxes, and 
expenditures values are constructed using the sum of state plus local amounts (while other 
revenue variables are composed of only state values), and “s” denotes that fiscal values are 16 
 
constructed using only state values.  The individual box entries can be interpreted using the 
following “legend”: 
  Entry    Sign of Coefficient    Significance Level (α)_____ 
  -3    Negative      0%  <   α  ≤   5% 
  -2    Negative      5%  <   α  ≤   10% 
  -1    Negative      10%  <   α  ≤   20% 
  -0    Negative      20%  <   α  ≤   100% 
  +0    Positive      20%  <   α  ≤   100% 
  +1    Positive      10%  <   α  ≤   20% 
  +2    Positive      5%  <   α  ≤   10% 
  +3    Positive      0%  <   α  ≤   5% 
   
so that numbers +3 and +2 denote positive coefficients with statistical significance at accepted 
levels (as do -3 and -2 for negative coefficients with some statistical significance), while 
numbers -1, -0, +0, and +1 denote little statistical significance.  Note that the Appendix Tables 
display the results for both ODR and LLS methods.  In general, the coefficient estimates from 
the two methods are similar, but there are also some striking differences.  In particular, nearly 
one-fourth of the coefficients estimated by the two methods have different signs.  Further, for 
more than 30 percent of these cases, one or the other estimate is significant at conventional 
levels; for more than 20 percent of these cases, both estimated coefficients are significant at 
conventional levels, but the correlation of one coefficient is positive while the correlation of the 
other coefficient is negative.  When the two methods produce significantly different coefficients, 
the Monte Carlo results discussed earlier indicate that the ODR coefficients are more likely to be 
reliable.  For this reason, our discussion focuses on the ODR results.  Note also that the constant 
term in the regressions (geREGcon) is generally positive and significant. 
4.1. Core Variables 
  The coefficient of the U.S. per capita income growth rate (usGRW) is positive and 
significantly different than zero (at the 95 percent confidence level) in every instance.  The 17 
 
estimated value is roughly 0.9, but it is significantly different than 1.0 in nearly all regressions, 
indicating that the individual states follow approximately the same growth pattern as the country 
as a whole and are responding individually to the same shocks and stimuli in roughly the same 




  Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
A  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977  +3        +3        +3        +3 
psl 1977          +3        +3        +3 
      1959  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3 
s    1959          +3        +3        +3 
      1947  +3        +3        +3        +3 
 
  For the U.S. inflation rate (usINF), our results indicate that higher inflation rates are 
significantly negatively correlated with per capita income growth in most specifications.  The 
estimated coefficient suggests that a one percent increase in inflation is associated with lower per 




  Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
A  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977  -0        -3        -3        -3 
psl 1977          -3        -3        -3 
      1959  +0  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3 
s    1959          -3        -3        -3 
      1947  +3        -3        -3        -3 
 
  Rising energy costs are generally thought to adversely affect economic growth.  Our 





  Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
A  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977  -3        -3        -3        -3 18 
 
psl 1977          -3        -3        -3 
      1959  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3 
s    1959          -3        -3        -3 
      1947  -3        -3        -3        -3 
 
  The dummy variable gePOLstate provides a simple designation of the “age” of the state, 
as determined by the year in which statehood was obtained.  Values of 1 for gePOLstate identify 
states that acquired statehood prior to 1800 (e.g., “old” states), while values of 0 identify states 
that acquired statehood after 1800 (e.g., “young” states).  The estimated coefficient for 
gePOLstate is always positive and statistically significant, indicating that older states have 
higher per capita income growth than younger states.  This is a plausible result, and is consistent 
with the presence of more developed infrastructures in older states.  However, this result is not 




  Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
A  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977  +3        +3        +3        +3 
psl 1977          +3        +3        +3 
      1959  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3 
s    1959          +3        +3        +3 
      1947  +3        +3        +3        +3 
 
  The neoclassical growth model asserts that, ceteris paribus, an economy with a lower 
initial income will grow faster than an economy with a higher initial income.  However, in our 
results, initial income (ys,t0) has quite variable effects on the various specifications.  When the 
explanatory variables include the full set of socio-economic regressors, our results provide little 
support for conditional convergence, and strong evidence of divergence after 1977.   
When the coefficient on ys,t0  is not significant at conventional levels, it might be argued 
that multicollinearity among the regressors is the problem.  However, variance decomposition 19 
 
results indicate that this is unlikely.  Moreover, our Monte Carlo experiments indicate that the 
measurement errors in per capita income have a significant and adverse effect on LLS results 
when annual data are employed.  However, if annual data are not used, then the fiscal and policy 
variables that are being examined must be aggregated over the period between observations to 
obtain a single representative value, even though it is the effect of the variation of these fiscal 
and policy variables that we are seeking to measure.  Hence, previously reported results of 
convergence are suspect either because they have not taken measurement errors into account, or 
because the fiscal and policy variables have been recorded in such a way that their effect on 
economic growth cannot be accurately determined.  The ODR results reported here suffer from 




  Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
A  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977  -0        +3        +3        +3 
psl 1977          +3        +3        +3 
      1959  -3  -3  +3  +3  +3  -3  +0  +0  +0  -3  -0  +0  +0 
s    1959          -0        -0        -0 
      1947  -3        +0        -1        -0 
 
  In sum, the analysis of the core variables identifies strong correlations where they are 
expected.  The only surprising result is that for initial income, which indicates divergence from 
1977 to the present. 
4.2. Fiscal Variables 
  The variable rvTXTOTAL (expressed as real dollars per capita or as a percent of total state 
income) includes all tax revenues but excludes transfers from the federal government.  The 
estimated coefficient on rvTXTOTAL is quite sensitive to the other variables that are included and 
also to the specific measures of tax and other fiscal variables; in additional specifications that are 20 
 
not reported here, the coefficient is also sensitive to the period of the estimation.  Depending on 
the parameterization and the starting year, the coefficient is sometimes significantly negative, 
sometimes significantly positive, and sometimes not significant at all.  It therefore appears that 
total tax revenue is not a very robust indicator of economic growth.  The most consistent results 
are observed when rvTXTOTAL is represented as a percent of income and the other fiscal 
variables are presented as a percent of total taxes; in these cases, the coefficient for rvTXTOTAL 





Per Capita  Percent of Income 
B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        -3        -3 
psl 1977        -3        -1 
      1959  +1  -0  +0  +0  -0  -0  -0  -0 
s     1959        +0        +0 
      1947        +0        +0 
 
  Corporate income taxation (rvTXINCcor) is represented as a per capita amount, as a 
percent of income, or as a percent of total tax revenue.  It might be expected that greater reliance 
on the corporate income tax would have a negative effect on economic growth.  However, the 
coefficient on rvTXINCcor is never significantly negative, and is frequently significantly positive 




Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        +3        +3        +1 
psl 1977        +1        +2        +0 
      1959  +0  +0  +0  +3  +0  +1  +0  +3  +0  +1  +1  +2 
s    1959        +1        +2        +0 
      1947        +0        +0        -0 
 21 
 
  Similar results are found for the individual income tax variable (rvTXINCind).  The 
estimated coefficient is never significantly negative at conventional levels, but its coefficient is 




Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        +3        +3        +3 
psl 1977        +3        +3        +1 
      1959  +0  +3  +3  +3  +0  +1  +1  +1  +0  +1  +1  +0 
s    1959        +2        +0        +0 
      1947        +1        +0        +0 
 
Not all states impose a general sales tax (rvTXSALgen).  Even so, the coefficients are 




Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        +3        +3        +3 
psl 1977        +3        +3        +0 
      1959  +0  +3  +3  +3  +0  +3  +2  +1  +0  +3  +2  +0 
s    1959        +3        +3        +3 
      1947        +3        +3        +2 
 
  Perhaps surprisingly, property taxes (rvTXPROP) are generally found to have a positive 
impact on state economic growth, a result that may be due to the improved local infrastructure 




Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        +3        +3        +3 
psl 1977        +3        +3        +3 
      1959  +3  +3  +2  +3  +3  +2  +2  +3  +3  +0  +0  +3 
s    1959        +0        -0        -0 
      1947        -0        -1        -1 
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  The coefficient on total transfers from the federal government (rvTRFtot) is always 




Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        +3        +3        +3 
psl 1977        +3        +3        +3 
      1959  +2  +3  +3  +3  +0  +2  +1  +3  +1  +3  +2  +0 
s    1959        +3        +3        +3 
      1947        +3        +2        +3 
 
  Similarly, federal transfers for education (rvTRFedu) are significantly and positively 
correlated with income growth in all instances.  The magnitude of coefficient indicates that each 
additional one dollar in per capita transfers is associated with an increase in per capita income 




Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        +3        +3        +3 
psl 1977        +3        +3        +3 
      1959  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3  +3 
s    1959        +3        +3        +3 
      1947        +3        +3        +3 
 
  In contrast, federal transfers for highways (rvTRFhwy) are not consistently related to 
economic growth.  Depending on the specification, the estimated coefficient is sometimes 
positive and significant, sometimes negative and significant, and sometimes insignificant.  The 
negative relationship between highway transfers and growth is most pronounced after 1977, 
perhaps due to the need for state matching funds.  Also, there are likely to be long lags associated 
with any benefits from highway construction. 
Variable: rvTRFhwy 
  Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 23 
 
Year: t0  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        -3        -3        -3 
psl 1977        -3        -3        -2 
      1959  -0  +0  +0  +1  -0  +0  +0  +0  -0  +0  +0  +0 
s    1959        +1        +0        +0 
      1947        +3        +1        -0 
 
  On the expenditure side, education expenditures (spEDUtot) are measured by spending 
on primary and secondary education.  This variable is always negatively and significantly 
correlated with income growth.  It is possible that greater expenditures on education reflect a 
higher proportion of the population under the age of 18, and this larger population group may not 




Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        -3        -3        -3 
psl 1977        -3        -3        -3 
      1959  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3  -3 
s    1959        -3        -3        -3 
      1947        -3        -3        -3 
 
  Similarly, the estimated coefficient for expenditures on highways (including capital 
construction) always has a negative correlation with per capita income growth, and the 
coefficient is typically (though not always) significant.  This result suggests that highway 




Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        -3        -3        -3 
psl 1977        -3        -3        -3 
      1959  -1  -3  -3  -3  -0  -1  -2  -3  -0  -2  -3  -3 
s    1959        -3        -3        -3 
      1947        -3        -3        -3 
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  Welfare expenditures (spWELtot) include intergovernmental expenditures for locally 
administered welfare programs as well as expenditures to offset federal payments for 
supplemental programs; cash assistance is included, but health and hospital services are not.  
This variable is always negatively correlated with growth, although its coefficient is not always 




Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        -3        -3        -3 
psl 1977        -3        -3        -3 
      1959  -1  -3  -3  -3  -0  -1  -2  -3  -0  -2  -3  -3 
s    1959        -3        -3        -3 
      1947        -3        -3        -3 
 
  Finally, spCAPhwy denotes direct capital outlays for the construction of roads and for the 
purchase of equipment, land, and other structures necessary for their use; it includes amounts for 
additions, for replacements, and for major alterations, but it excludes expenditures for repairs.  
One would expect a positive correlation between spCAPhwy and growth; however, the 




Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 
B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        -0        -1        -1 
psl 1977        -0        -0        -0 
      1959  -3  -1  -0  -0  -0  -2  -0  -0  -0  -2  -0  -0 
s    1959        -3        -3        -3 
      1947        -3        -3        -3 
 
  Perhaps the most surprising of these fiscal results is the somewhat inconsistent impact of 
taxation on economic growth, as measured by total taxes, rvTXTOTAL.  Results for the 
components of taxation are slightly more consistent, but these results often indicate a surprising 25 
 
positive (though often statistically insignificant) impact of taxes on growth.  Also, transfers (in 
total and for education) typically have a positive and significant impact on growth, while 
transfers for highways generate mixed results.  Indeed, the expenditure results are considerably 
more consistent than the tax results.  In almost all cases, expenditures are negatively and 
significantly correlated with growth in per capita income, even spending that augments state 
infrastructure. 
4.3. Socio-economic, Demographic, Geographic, and Political Variables 
  We have also included many other variables in various specifications.  We do not discuss 
all of these results in detail, but it is useful to highlight some of the more provocative findings. 
  One political variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the governor of the state (in 
the previous year) is Republican and 0 otherwise (dmPOLgov).  It is widely believed that 
Republicans are more sympathetic to, and more encouraging of, policies that generate economic 
growth.  However, the estimated coefficient on dmPOLgov is always negative and often 
significantly so.   
Similarly, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state has a TEL in place (on 
either the tax or the expenditure side) and 0 otherwise (dmTXREF).  It might be expected that 
such limitations increase growth by placing limits on the size and the reach of government; in 
contrast, a TEL might lead to reductions in government infrastructure and service spending, 
thereby reducing growth.  In fact, we find that the coefficient on dmTXREF is always negative, 
though not always statistically significant.  Regressions F and G, which cover the period from 
1977 to 1996 and which exclude the five high volatility states, indicate that passage of a TEL 
reduces per capita income growth by about three tenths of a percentage point. 
Variable: dmTAXref 
  Per Capita  Percent of Income  Percent of Total Tax 26 
 
Year: t0  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG  B  C  D  EFG 
asl 1977        -3        -3        -3 
psl 1977        -3        -3        -3 
      1959  na  -1  -1  -3  na  0  0  -3  na  0  -1  -3 
s    1959        0        -1        -1 
      1947        0        0        0 
 
Another political variable measures the frequency of party change (gePOLCgov).  One 
can argue that a state that changes its governing party more frequently is somewhat unstable, 
which would inhibit growth.  One can also argue that a higher value of gePOLCgov indicates a 
state with a greater willingness to undertake risks or a state with a balanced political orientation, 
both of which might be reflected in higher growth (Crain 2003).  The sign of gePOLCgov is 
always positive and, at least since 1977, always significant. 
We include various geographic variables, reflecting the size of the state’s land area 
(geSIZ), the ratio of federal land to total land area (geSIZPf), and adjacency to the east coast 
(geREGatl) or the west coast (geREGpac).  The coefficient on land area is seldom significant, 
and the coefficient on geSIZPf is generally negative and significant, indicating that federal 
occupation of state lands discourages economic growth.  As for the adjacency variables, being on 
the Atlantic Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico tends to have a positive impact on growth, while being 
in a state that adjoins the Pacific Ocean has a consistent negative impact. 
  Demographic variables — the state’s population in millions (dmPOP) or the ratio of state 
population to state land area (dmDEN) — both have erratic and inconsistent impacts on growth.  
Several other variables that measure the coefficient of variation of wages in six employment 
sectors (dmWAGEcv) and the coefficient of variation of payrolls in these same sectors 
(dmPRNFPcv) also have inconsistent, though largely negative, effects on growth.  Because 
larger values for these variables indicate greater disparity in either the level of wages 27 
 
(dmWAGEcv) or the level of employment (dmPRNFPcv) in these sectors, the negative 
coefficients on these variables suggest that the concentration of a state’s employment base in 
fewer sectors has a positive effect on growth. 
  Overall, these different results tend to be somewhat more robust than those for the fiscal 
variables (especially the tax variables). 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper reports the results of an empirical analysis of economic growth in the United 
States for the years 1947 through 1997, presenting empirical results against which theoretical 
models of economic growth can be compared.  The analysis uses annual data to examine the 
effects of government policy variables at the state and local levels, as well as the effects of a 
wide range of other socio-economic, demographic, geographic, and political variables. 
The empirical literature on economic growth includes hundreds of articles examining the 
growth effects of a multitude of variables.  Our paper differs from these studies in several 
important ways: it examines annual data over a longer period than most other studies, it includes 
a much more comprehensive collection of explanatory variables, and it addresses the 
measurement errors inherent in per capita income data. 
Several main conclusions emerge. 
First, our estimation results indicate that a state’s fiscal policies have a measurable 
relationship with per capita income growth, although not always in the expected direction and 
seldom in a way that is robust to alternative specifications. Tax impacts on state economic 
growth are quite variable; expenditure impacts are more consistent across different 
specifications.  The statistically significant correlation between state (and state plus local) total 28 
 
tax revenues and economic growth is very sensitive to the regressor set and the time period 
examined.  Often, there are highly significant correlations measured between these variables and 
per capita income growth, but further work needs to be done before it can be determined what 
these results mean. 
Second, there is strong evidence that a state’s political orientation, as indicated by 
whether the governor is Republican or Democrat, whether the state has enacted tax and 
expenditure limitation legislation, and whether the state frequently elects a governor of the same 
party as the incumbent, have consistent, measurable, and significant effects on economic growth.  
Perhaps surprisingly, having a Republican governor is associated with lower rates of growth. 
Third, the methods commonly employed for growth regression analyses could be 
inadequate and could adversely affect the results because most previously reported results have 
not taken measurement errors into account.  Again, we do not discuss these results in detail here, 
but we have some evidence that it is very likely that measurement errors have had a significant 
impact on previously reported growth regression results, especially with regards to convergence. 
Indeed, although ordinary linear least squares estimates suggest that there is conditional 
convergence in per capita income across the 48 contiguous states, our ODR estimates indicate 
strong evidence of divergence. 
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Table 1: State Per Capita Income Growth Rates 
Variable     Minimum  Medium  Maximum  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
GROWTH RATE  1947 to 1997  -26.881343  2.599185  37.466502  2.463311  3.566412 
        1959 to 1997  -11.979529  2.636467  37.466502  2.529837  2.928958 
        1977 to 1997  -11.979529  2.342378  18.533654  2.221870  2.470992 
        1947  -7.188256  2.688347  27.763463  3.380174  6.392585 
        1959  -2.399308  1.337050  17.540014  1.412017  2.892205 
        1977  2.035510  4.751758  18.533654  5.280604  2.562704 
        1997  -2.094665  2.794675  4.523854  2.759872  1.034305 
        AL  -5.449525  2.757499  10.047148  3.004919  2.653822 
        AZ  -5.314906  2.461079  11.169953  2.346481  3.042259 
        AR  -8.250670  3.003985  13.210948  3.085245  3.615919 
        CA  -2.719498  2.190122  8.734397  1.965693  2.381787 
        CO  -4.607509  2.588700  10.584516  2.473059  2.479050 
        CT  -5.192651  3.113621  12.823114  2.616590  3.251940 
        DE  -7.124412  2.195789  14.270855  2.188016  3.414032 
        FL  -3.742361  3.039199  9.763492  2.619060  2.772511 
        GA  -3.106167  3.019119  8.839196  3.103741  2.709899 
        ID  -6.785022  2.230977  11.222756  2.047681  3.439490 
        IL  -7.220754  2.590271  8.517273  2.164266  2.737236 
        IN  -8.058500  2.496404  10.963497  2.263290  3.652122 
        IA  -17.425284  2.879678  27.763463  2.534621  6.242572 
        KS  -5.785119  1.958987  11.795970  2.323780  3.257377 
        KY  -5.841354  3.186884  9.025797  2.851088  2.821149 
        LA  -2.748423  3.172533  9.069085  2.782600  2.351436 
        ME  -4.188888  2.615366  7.570101  2.358116  2.724728 
        MD  -4.977451  2.975081  8.812488  2.608829  2.389123 
        MA  -2.141386  2.639059  10.893857  2.660012  2.653370 
        MI  -6.957617  2.474794  11.552469  2.200374  3.878417 
        MN  -8.526884  2.608256  10.877609  2.573086  3.145711 
        MS  -12.277717  3.041126  13.491000  3.151690  4.153382 
        MO  -3.532584  2.639179  7.185746  2.413513  2.341626 
        MT  -14.136631  1.051058  16.304480  1.726461  4.744971 
        NE  -13.609717  1.916035  15.952952  2.427993  5.118237 
        NV  -6.058414  2.187897  9.921601  1.925878  3.379783 
        NH  -2.985046  3.202911  9.119015  2.763886  2.660554 
        NJ  -3.454446  2.820757  10.006480  2.543315  2.504472 
        NM  -2.344977  2.292986  6.896486  2.366553  1.698676 
        NY  -3.154640  2.156333  8.891542  2.220444  2.295454 
        NC  -4.031960  3.202856  10.020423  3.011300  2.758439 
        ND  -18.446142  0.274876  37.466502  2.147741  10.457444 
        OH  -5.514968  2.415200  9.547198  2.201988  3.106119 
        OK  -4.775598  2.425839  6.657016  2.444566  2.522105 
        OR  -4.185013  2.388269  9.642536  2.024612  2.609964 
        PA  -4.562608  2.986885  9.507484  2.359050  2.391755 
        RI  -7.188256  2.846378  11.645216  2.242600  3.076794 
        SC  -6.559704  2.923692  12.802803  3.053797  3.375291 
        SD  -26.881343  2.507430  19.887830  2.411537  8.079090 
        TN  -2.489182  2.840871  8.866908  2.982792  2.497893 
        TX  -2.192101  2.556739  7.301671  2.538288  2.181111 
        UT  -2.770354  2.119372  7.501084  2.165610  2.080932 
        VT  -5.612176  2.645886  9.100968  2.535519  2.813045 
        VA  -1.978435  3.095995  10.022425  3.021686  2.503227 
        WA  -2.749638  2.223326  7.612945  2.219363  2.377244 
        WV  -7.859453  2.589515  8.211955  2.293188  2.819456 
        WI  -4.567007  2.494046  10.469997  2.351700  2.780058 
        WY  -5.819025  2.033767  8.776452  1.923314  3.262017 





Table 2: State Revenue Variables 
Variable Name Class  Subclass  Qualifier  Units 
rvTXTOTAL    Tax   none    total taxes from all sources  real U.S.$ 
rvTXCON    Tax   consumption   total (sales + income)  real U.S.$ 
rvTXINCtot   Tax   consumption   income:  total (individual + corporate) real U.S.$ 
rvTXINCcor   Tax   consumption   income:  corporate   real U.S.$ 
rvTXINCind   Tax   consumption   income:  individual  real U.S.$ 
rvTXSALtot   Tax   consumption   sales:  total (general + selective)  real U.S.$ 
rvTXSALgen   Tax   consumption   sales:  general  real U.S.$ 
rvTXSALsel   Tax   consumption   sales:  selective  real U.S.$ 
rvTXPROP    Tax   wealth    property   real U.S.$ 
rvTXSEV    Tax   other   severance  real U.S.$ 
rvTXNEC    Tax   other   not elsewhere classified   real U.S.$ 
rvTRFtot   Transfers   federal   total transfer  real U.S.$ 
rvTRFedu   Transfers   federal   transfers for education  real U.S.$ 
rvTRFhwy   Transfers   federal   transfers for highways   real U.S.$ 
rvTRFnec   Transfers   federal   not elsewhere classified   real U.S.$ 
 
Table 3: State Expenditure Variables 
Variable Name  Class  Subclass  Qualifier  Units 
spEDUtot  spending  None   education:  total (general + higher + capital outlays)  real U.S.$ 
spEDUgen  spending  None   education:  general primary and secondary, including capital construction  real U.S.$ 
spEDUhi  spending  None   education:  higher, including capital construction  real U.S.$ 
spHWYtot  spending  None   highways:  total  real U.S.$ 
spWELtot  spending  None   welfare:  total  real U.S.$ 
spHHtot  spending  None   health and hospitals:  total  real U.S.$ 
spPPtot  spending  None   police protection  real U.S.$ 
spNEC  spending  None   not elsewhere classified  real U.S.$ 
spCAPtot  spending  Capital   total  real U.S.$ 
spCAPhwy  spending  Capital   highways  real U.S.$ 
spCAPedu  spending  Capital   education  real U.S.$ 
spCAPnec  spending  Capital   not elsewhere classified   real U.S.$ 
 
 
Table 4: State Demographic Variables 
Variable 
Name 
Class  Subclass Qualifier  Units 
dmPOP          population                none                      total                                                             thousands of persons 
dmDEN          population                none                      population density                                                           population per land  area 
dmDENsq        population                none                      squared population density                                                          squared population per 
 land area 
dmDENnf        population                none                      population density on nonfederal land                                                           population per land area 
dmDENnfsq      population                none                      squared population density on nonfederal land                                                          squared population per 
 land area 
dmPOLgov       political orientation   none                      Republican governor                                               dummy variable 
dmPOLup        political orientation   none                      Republican majority in upper house                                dummy variable 
dmPOLlow       political orientation   none                      Republican majority in lower house                                dummy variable 
dmPOLboth      political orientation   none                      Republican majority in both houses                                dummy variable 
dmPOLnone      political orientation   none                      Republican majority in neither house                              dummy variable 
dmPOLallR      political orientation   none                      Republican governor and Republican majority in both 
 houses                 
 dummy variable 
dmPOLallD      political orientation   none                      not Republican governor and not Republican majority in 
 either house  
 dummy variable 
dmTXref      political orientation   none                      tax and expenditure limit enacted    dummy variable 
dmTXsvl      political orientation   none                      percentage of total state plus local tax revenues collected 
 at the state level  
 Percent 
dmPRNFPcv      payroll  distribution       none                coefficient of variation of private sector payrolls                percent of population 
dmISNFPcv      income distribution       none                      coefficient of variation of private sector incomes sources                 percent of population 
dmWAGEcv       wage distribution       none                      coefficient of variation of private sector wages                percent of population 34 
 
dmISFEDpc      income sources            nonfarm                   per capita income from federal income sources              percent of population 
dmPRNFtot     payroll    nonfarm                   total, all private and government sectors    percent of population 
dmPRNFPtot     payroll    nonfarm                   total, all private sectors    percent of population 
dmPRNFPcon     payroll    nonfarm                   private: construction sector    percent of population 
dmPRNFPman    payroll    nonfarm                   private: manufacturing sector    percent of population 
dmPRNFPtpu   payroll    nonfarm                   private: transportation & public utilities sector      percent of population 
dmPRNFPtrdt    payroll    nonfarm                   private: wholesale & retail trade sector            percent of population 
dmPRNFPfin     payroll    nonfarm                   private: finance & insurance & real estate sector             percent of population 
dmPRNFPser     payroll    nonfarm                   private: services sector    percent of population 
dmPRNFGtot     payroll    nonfarm                   government: federal, state and local sectors    percent of population 
dmIStot   income sources   none   total personal income   real U.S.$ 
dmISPROtot   income sources   proprietors'  Total   percent of total income 
dmISFRMtot   income sources   farm   Total   percent of total income 
dmISNFtot   income sources   nonfarm   Total   percent of total income 
dmISNFPtot   income sources   nonfarm   private: total, all private sectors   percent of total income 
dmISNFPag   income sources   nonfarm   private: ag.services & forestry & fishing & other sector   percent of total income 
dmISNFPmin   income sources   nonfarm   private: mining sector   percent of total income 
dmISNFPcon   income sources   nonfarm   private: construction sector   percent of total income 
dmISNFPman   income sources   nonfarm   private: manufacturing sector   percent of total income 
dmISNFPtpu   income sources            nonfarm                   private: transportation & public utilities sector   percent of total income 
dmISNFPtrd   income sources   nonfarm   private: wholesale & retail trade sector   percent of total income 
dmISNFPfin   income sources   nonfarm   private: finance & insurance & real estate sector   percent of total income 
dmISNFPser   income sources   nonfarm   private: services sector   percent of total income 
dmISNFGtot   income sources   nonfarm   government: federal, state and local sectors   percent of total income 
dmISNFGfed   income sources   nonfarm   government: federal   percent of total income 
dmISNFGmil   income sources   nonfarm   government: federal military   percent of total income 
dmISNFGsl   income sources   nonfarm   government: state and local sectors   percent of total income 
dmWAGEmin     wage & salary   nonfarm   private: mining sector   percent of total income 
dmWAGEcon     wage & salary   nonfarm   private: construction sector   percent of total income 
dmWAGEman     wage & salary   nonfarm   private: manufacturing sector   percent of total income 
dmWAGEtpu   wage & salary   nonfarm                   private:  transportation  public utilities sector   percent of total income 
dmWAGEtrd    wage & salary   nonfarm                   private:  wholesale and retail trade sector   percent of total income 
dmWAGEfire   wage & salary   Nonfarm   private:  financeinsurancereal estate sector   percent of total income 
dmWAGEser     wage & salary   Nonfarm   private:  services sector   percent of total income 
dmWAGEgov     wage & salary   Nonfarm   government:  federal, state and local sectors                                                percent of total income 
 
 
Table 5: State Geographic Variables 
Variable Name Class  Subclass  Qualifier  Units 
geHEtotP  people  socio-
economic 
1947 higher education enrollment: total first time students  percent of 1947 population 
geHEwmP  people  socio-
economic 
1947 higher education enrollment: women first time students  percent of 1947 enrollment 
geSIZt  land  Area  total excluding water areas  hundreds of square miles 
geSIZPf  land  Area  federal surface area, 1982  percent of total state area 
geSIZPw  land  Area  woodlands, 1982  percent of total state area 
geSIZPr  land  Area  rangelands, 1982  percent of total state area 
gePOLstate  political orientation  None  statehood granted prior to 1800  dummy variable 
gePOLgov  political orientation  None  average of dmPOLgovs,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLup  political orientation  None  average of dmPOLups,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLlow  political orientation  None  average of dmPOLlows,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLboth  political orientation  None  average of dmPOLboths,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLnone  political orientation  None  average of dmPOLnones,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLallR  political orientation  None  average of dmPOLallRs,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLallD  political orientation  None  average of dmPOLallDs,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLCgov  political orientation  None  standard deviation of dmPOLgovs,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLCup  political orientation  None  standard deviation of dmPOLups,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLClow  political orientation  None  standard deviation of dmPOLlows,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLCboth  political orientation  None  standard deviation of dmPOLboths,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLCnone  political orientation  None  standard deviation of dmPOLnones,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLCallR  political orientation  None  standard deviation of dmPOLallRs,t  for all t  percent 
gePOLCallD  political orientation  None  standard deviation of dmPOLallDs,t  for all t  percent 
geREG1  land  Region  New England(CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT)  dummy variable 35 
 
geREG2  Land  Region  middle Atlantic (DE, MD, NJ, NY, PA)  dummy variable 
geREG3  Land  Region  east north central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)  dummy variable 
geREG4  Land  Region  west north central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)  dummy variable 
geREG5  Land  Region  south Atlantic (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV)  dummy variable 
geREG6  Land  Region  east south central (AZ, NM, OK, TX)  dummy variable 
geREG7  Land  Region  mountain (CO, ID, MT, UT, WY)  dummy variable 
geREG8  Land  Region  Pacific (CA, NV, OR, WA)  dummy variable 
geREG9  Land  Region  noncontiguous U.S. (AK, HI)  dummy variable 
geREGatl  Land  Region  east coast  dummy variable 
geREGpac  Land  Region  west coast  dummy variable 
geREGcan  Land  Region  Canada border  dummy variable 
geREGmex  Land  Region  Mexico border  dummy variable 
geREGcon  Land  Region  constant  dummy variable 
geCRrt  Land  Climate  rainy-tropical  dummy variable 
geCRhst  Land  Climate  humid-subtropical  dummy variable 
geCRhc  Land  Climate  humid-continental  dummy variable 
geCRmt  Land  Climate  marine-temperate  dummy variable 
geCRmed  Land  Climate  Mediterranean  dummy variable 
geCRsa  Land  Climate  semi-arid  dummy variable 
geCRd  Land  Climate  desert  dummy variable 
geCRarc  Land  Climate  arctic and sub-arctic  dummy variable 
geCRalp  Land  Climate  alpine  dummy variable 
geMNau  Land  Resources  gold deposits  dummy variable 
geMNcoal  Land  Resources  coal deposits  dummy variable 
geMNfe  Land  Resources  iron ore deposits  dummy variable 
geMNgas  Land  Resources  natural gas deposits  dummy variable 
geMNmo  Land  Resources  molybdenum deposits  dummy variable 
geMNoil  Land  Resources  petroleum deposits  dummy variable 
geMNu  Land  Resources  uranium deposits  dummy variable 
geMNfuel  Land  Resources  coal, natural gas and/or petroleum deposits  dummy variable 
geMN  Land  Resources  gold, coal, iron ore, natural gas, molybdenum, or petroleum deposits  dummy variable 
geAGwt  Land  agricultural  wheat production  dummy variable 
geAGcn  Land  agricultural  corn production  dummy variable 
geAG  Land  agricultural  wheat and/or corn production  dummy variable 
 
Table 6:  Variables Associated with the U.S. as a Whole 
Variable Name Class  Subclass  Qualifier  Units 
usFUELpp  miscellaneous  None  average producer price for fuels  real u.s.$ 
usDEFcw  miscellaneous  None  chained weight deflator (1996=1.0)  percent 
usDEFfw  miscellaneous  None  fixed weight deflator (1996=1.0)  percent 
usPOP  miscellaneous  None  total population of 48 contiguous states (excluding DC)  thousands of persons 
usINCtot  miscellaneous  None  total income of 48 contiguous states (excluding DC)  thousands of persons 
usGRW  miscellaneous  None  U.S. growth rate  percent 










Table A1:  Regression A (1959 – 1997)
a 










usGRW  odr  0.9302812  0.0289600  32.12  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.8378600  0.0531617  15.76  0.00% *** 
usINF  odr  0.0000929  0.0001454  0.64  26.14%  
  lls  0.0001690  0.0001344  1.26  10.44%  
usFUELpp  odr  -0.0019124  0.0003440  -5.56  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0019699  0.0003242  -6.08  0.00% *** 
geREGcon  odr  0.0160398  0.0020163  7.96  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0203461  0.0019015  10.70  0.00% *** 
gePOLstate  odr  0.0036382  0.0006269  5.80  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0034087  0.0001286  26.51  0.00% *** 
y0  odr  -0.0012481  0.0001683  -7.42  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0015189  0.0000344  -44.21  0.00% *** 
Rho  odr  0.0099271  0.0015337  6.47  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0046268  0.0004614  10.03  0.00% *** 
R
2  odr  99.9        
lls  96.7        
ℓ(∙)  odr  -9781.8        
lls  -12325.3        
σε 
odr  163.1        
nls  1032.7        
lls  0.05554        
σε
y 
odr  165.2        
lls  Na        
σε
yt0 
odr  39.2        
lls  Na        
σε
γ 
odr  0.00914        
lls  Na        
***  indicates H0 is rejected at α = 5% significance level. 
**   indicates H0 is rejected at α = 10% significance level. 
*    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 20% significance level. 
a  ℓ(∙) denotes the value of the likehood function.  [σε , σεy , σεyt0 , σγ] denotes the standard 
deviations of the estimated residuals, the measurement error of income, the measurement error for 
initial income y0 , and the model, respectively; the standard deviation σε is a weighted average of the 
measurement error standard deviations and the model standard deviation. 38 
 
Table A2:  Regression B (per capita; 1959 – 1997)
a 










usGRW  odr  0.9164151  0.0305155  30.03  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.8094562  0.0486160  16.65  0.00% *** 
usINF  odr  -0.0005217  0.0001752  -2.98  0.15% *** 
  lls  0.0000344  0.0001224  0.28  38.94%  
usFUELpp  odr  -0.0022860  0.0004129  -5.54  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0018108  0.0003250  -5.57  0.00% *** 
geREGcon  odr  0.0159364  0.0028225  5.65  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0251525  0.0017342  14.50  0.00% *** 
gePOLstate  odr  0.0026335  0.0007548  3.49  0.02% *** 
  lls  0.0024147  0.0001521  15.88  0.00% *** 
y0  odr  -0.0005696  0.0002808  -2.03  2.13% *** 
  lls  -0.0019923  0.0000757  -26.31  0.00% *** 
rho  odr  0.0100623  0.0015213  6.61  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0049265  0.0004665  10.56  0.00% *** 
rvTXTOTAL  odr  0.0031377  0.0027695  1.13  12.87%  
  lls  0.0082254  0.0008457  9.73  0.00% *** 
rvTXINCcor  odr  0.0089821  0.0097420  0.92  17.83%  
  lls  0.0034075  0.0028961  1.18  11.98%  
rvTXINCind  odr  0.0032783  0.0030738  1.07  14.32%  
  lls  -0.0022551  0.0008762  -2.57  0.51% *** 
rvTXSALgen  odr  0.0028672  0.0032352  0.89  18.78%  
  lls  -0.0002181  0.0008425  -0.26  39.79%  
rvTXPROP  odr  0.0060951  0.0024430  2.49  0.63% *** 
  lls  0.0022668  0.0005968  3.80  0.01% *** 
rvTRFtot  odr  0.0090632  0.0046069  1.97  2.47% *** 
  lls  -0.0018527  0.0017677  -1.05  14.74%  
rvTRFedu  odr  0.1209462  0.0185788  6.51  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0326072  0.0062439  5.22  0.00% *** 
rvTRFhwy  odr  -0.0036942  0.0127112  -0.29  38.57%  
  lls  -0.0250445  0.0039599  -6.32  0.00% *** 
spEDUtot  odr  -0.0210545  0.0033184  -6.34  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0119434  0.0010889  -10.97  0.00% *** 
spHWYtot  odr  -0.0017725  0.0098695  -0.18  42.87%  
  lls  -0.0061415  0.0024377  -2.52  0.59% *** 
spWELtot  odr  -0.0095676  0.0046721  -2.05  2.04% *** 
  lls  -0.0080643  0.0017390  -4.64  0.00% *** 
spCAPhwy  odr  -0.0129220  0.0136243  -0.95  17.15%  
  lls  0.0182959  0.0041463  4.41  0.00% *** 
R
2  odr  99.9         
lls  97.5         
ℓ(∙)  odr  -9737.6         
lls  -12026.7         
σε 
odr  161.4         
nls  872.9         
lls  0.04801         
σε
y 
odr  163.4         
lls  Na         
σε
yt0 
odr  40.7         
lls  Na         
σε
γ 
odr  0.00881         
lls  Na         
***   indicates H0 is rejected at α = 5% significance level. 
**    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 10% significance level. 
*    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 20% significance level. 
a  ℓ(∙) denotes the value of the likehood function.  [σε , σεy , σεyt0 , σγ] denotes the standard 
deviations of the estimated residuals, the measurement error of income, the measurement error for 
initial income y0 , and the model, respectively; the standard deviation σε is a weighted average of the 
measurement error standard deviations and the model standard deviation. 39 
 
Table A3:  Regression C (per capita; 1959 – 1997)
a 










usGRW  odr  0.9103451  0.0315407  28.86  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.9114855  0.0458009  19.90  0.00% *** 
usINF  odr  -0.0008893  0.0002041  -4.36  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0001180  0.0001151  -1.03  15.26%  
usFUELpp  odr  -0.0034089  0.0005795  -5.88  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0034584  0.0004359  -7.93  0.00% *** 
geREGcon  odr  0.0308275  0.0106647  2.89  0.19% *** 
  lls  0.0359358  0.0031414  11.44  0.00% *** 
gePOLstate  odr  0.0031325  0.0011917  2.63  0.43% *** 
  lls  0.0018480  0.0002333  7.92  0.00% *** 
y0  odr  0.0016896  0.0005873  2.88  0.20% *** 
  lls  -0.0008591  0.0001285  -6.68  0.00% *** 
Rho  odr  0.0099415  0.0015490  6.42  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0080705  0.0005671  14.23  0.00% *** 
rvTXTOTAL  odr  -0.0025031  0.0037391  -0.67  25.17%  
  lls  0.0024610  0.0016153  1.52  6.39% * 
rvTXINCcor  odr  0.0178962  0.0121115  1.48  6.98% * 
  lls  0.0093894  0.0043028  2.18  1.46% *** 
rvTXINCind  odr  0.0127397  0.0039577  3.22  0.07% *** 
  lls  -0.0007078  0.0014570  -0.49  31.36%  
rvTXSALgen  odr  0.0100464  0.0041880  2.40  0.83% *** 
  lls  0.0004336  0.0012976  0.33  36.91%  
rvTXPROP  odr  0.0127685  0.0043262  2.95  0.16% *** 
  lls  0.0097438  0.0014494  6.72  0.00% *** 
rvTRFtot  odr  0.0194855  0.0057389  3.40  0.04% *** 
  lls  -0.0077557  0.0025860  -3.00  0.14% *** 
rvTRFedu  odr  0.1577795  0.0217607  7.25  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0443102  0.0087588  5.06  0.00% *** 
rvTRFhwy  odr  0.0039490  0.0153767  0.26  39.87%  
  lls  0.0234687  0.0062073  3.78  0.01% *** 
spEDUtot  odr  -0.0287435  0.0044638  -6.44  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0081807  0.0020084  -4.07  0.00% *** 
spHWYtot  odr  -0.0426024  0.0155098  -2.75  0.30% *** 
  lls  -0.0108664  0.0047621  -2.28  1.13% *** 
spWELtot  odr  -0.0193764  0.0059203  -3.27  0.05% *** 
  lls  -0.0039471  0.0029446  -1.34  9.01% * 
spCAPhwy  odr  0.0149744  0.0185924  0.81  21.03%  
  lls  -0.0022078  0.0064458  -0.34  36.60%  
dmPOLgov  odr  -0.0010380  0.0008451  -1.23  10.98%  
  lls  -0.0022265  0.0005086  -4.38  0.00% *** 
dmTXref  odr  -0.0017153  0.0011325  -1.51  6.50% * 
  lls  0.0000856  0.0005383  0.16  43.68%  
dmTXsvl  odr  0.0000085  0.0000774  0.11  45.61%  
  lls  0.0000588  0.0000208  2.83  0.24% *** 
dmPOP  odr  -0.0001841  0.0001553  -1.19  11.80%  
  lls  -0.0000097  0.0000355  -0.27  39.20%  
dmDEN  odr  -0.0005325  0.0012430  -0.43  33.42%  
  lls  -0.0001418  0.0002607  -0.54  29.32%  
dmWAGEcv  odr  -0.0116700  0.0124409  -0.94  17.42%  
  lls  -0.0236378  0.0041351  -5.72  0.00% *** 
dmPRNFPcv  odr  0.0064222  0.0102452  0.63  26.54%  
  lls  0.0071484  0.0028476  2.51  0.61% *** 
geHEtotP  odr  -0.5747542  0.1350808  -4.25  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.2797150  0.0302948  -9.23  0.00% *** 
geSIZ  odr  0.0000497  0.0000235  2.12  1.73% *** 
  lls  0.0000221  0.0000039  5.61  0.00% *** 
geSIZPf  odr  -0.0000703  0.0000352  -1.99  2.31% *** 
  lls  -0.0000433  0.0000083  -5.22  0.00% *** 
geREGatl  odr  0.0005882  0.0013128  0.45  32.71%  
  lls  0.0000483  0.0002643  0.18  42.74%  40 
 
Table A3: Regression C, continued (per capita; 1959 – 1997) 










geREGpac  odr  -0.0019007  0.0019409  -0.98  16.38%  
  lls  0.0008022  0.0003446  2.33  1.00% *** 
gePOLCgov  odr  0.0005146  0.0001658  3.10  0.10% *** 
  lls  0.0002152  0.0000312  6.89  0.00% *** 
geSIZPw  odr  -0.0000131  0.0000394  -0.33  36.93%  
  lls  -0.0000133  0.0000088  -1.51  6.53% * 
geSIZPr  odr  -0.0000142  0.0000505  -0.28  38.93%  
  lls  -0.0000654  0.0000106  -6.17  0.00% *** 
geREGcan  odr  0.0020619  0.0010451  1.97  2.43% *** 
  lls  0.0009324  0.0002225  4.19  0.00% *** 
geREGmex  odr  -0.0094067  0.0025413  -3.70  0.01% *** 
  lls  -0.0041743  0.0004759  -8.77  0.00% *** 
gePOLallR  odr  0.0002229  0.0000990  2.25  1.23% *** 
  lls  -0.0000209  0.0000221  -0.95  17.15%  
gePOLgov  odr  -0.0000203  0.0000497  -0.41  34.17%  
  lls  -0.0000072  0.0000106  -0.68  24.80%  
gePOLboth  odr  -0.0000219  0.0000478  -0.46  32.36%  
  lls  0.0001044  0.0000143  7.32  0.00% *** 
gePOLCallR  odr  -0.0005000  0.0002561  -1.95  2.55% ** 
  lls  -0.0003202  0.0000430  -7.44  0.00% *** 
gePOLCboth  odr  0.0002060  0.0001670  1.23  10.88%  
  lls  0.0000306  0.0000319  0.96  16.90%  
dmDENsq  odr  -0.0000353  0.0001087  -0.32  37.27%  
  lls  -0.0000147  0.0000244  -0.60  27.29%  
dmPOLallR  odr  -0.0013788  0.0017298  -0.80  21.28%  
  lls  0.0043822  0.0010388  4.22  0.00% *** 
dmPOLboth  odr  0.0011429  0.0015565  0.73  23.14%  
  lls  -0.0046978  0.0008205  -5.73  0.00% *** 
dmISNFPcv  odr  -0.0144514  0.0072304  -2.00  2.29% *** 
  lls  -0.0067683  0.0018157  -3.73  0.01% *** 
dmISFEDpc  odr  -0.0019222  0.0013498  -1.42  7.73% * 
  lls  -0.0024400  0.0004793  -5.09  0.00% *** 
dmPRNFPman  odr  -0.0000585  0.0001426  -0.41  34.08%  
  lls  -0.0000456  0.0000328  -1.39  8.22% * 
dmPRNFPtpu  odr  -0.0012225  0.0007173  -1.70  4.43% ** 
  lls  -0.0010796  0.0001606  -6.72  0.00% *** 
dmPRNFPser  odr  0.0000614  0.0002306  0.27  39.51%  
  lls  -0.0001070  0.0000518  -2.07  1.94% *** 
R
2  odr  99.9         
lls  98.3         
ℓ(∙)  odr  -9695.6         
lls  -11641.3         
σε 
odr  161.0         
nls  702.6         
lls  0.03953         
σε
y 
odr  162.9         
lls  Na         
σε
yt0 
odr  50.8         
lls  Na         
σε
γ 
odr  0.00843         
lls  Na         
***   indicates H0 is rejected at α = 5% significance level. 
**    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 10% significance level. 
*    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 20% significance level. 
a  ℓ(∙) denotes the value of the likehood function.  [σε , σεy , σεyt0 , σγ] denotes the standard 
deviations of the estimated residuals, the measurement error of income, the measurement error for 
initial income y0 , and the model, respectively; the standard deviation σε is a weighted average of the 
measurement error standard deviations and the model standard deviation. 41 
 
Table A4:  Regression D (per capita; 1959 – 1997)
a 










usGRW  odr  0.9056973  0.0310002  29.22  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.7972571  0.0469863  16.97  0.00% *** 
usINF  odr  -0.0007685  0.0001910  -4.02  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0001856  0.0001211  1.53  6.29% * 
usFUELpp  odr  -0.0026697  0.0004488  -5.95  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0012525  0.0003493  -3.59  0.02% *** 
geREGcon  odr  0.0244796  0.0060740  4.03  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0304117  0.0019761  15.39  0.00% *** 
gePOLstate  odr  0.0029490  0.0009897  2.98  0.15% *** 
  lls  0.0019421  0.0001870  10.39  0.00% *** 
y0  odr  0.0007136  0.0003578  1.99  2.31% *** 
  lls  -0.0016088  0.0000900  -17.88  0.00% *** 
rho  odr  0.0102350  0.0015342  6.67  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0057333  0.0004827  11.88  0.00% *** 
rvTXTOTAL  odr  0.0026112  0.0031381  0.83  20.27%  
  lls  0.0035484  0.0013141  2.70  0.35% *** 
rvTXINCcor  odr  0.0141929  0.0111683  1.27  10.20%  
  lls  0.0089559  0.0033751  2.65  0.40% *** 
rvTXINCind  odr  0.0071333  0.0034335  2.08  1.89% *** 
  lls  0.0002430  0.0011205  0.22  41.42%  
rvTXSALgen  odr  0.0094404  0.0038200  2.47  0.68% *** 
  lls  0.0015895  0.0011734  1.35  8.79% * 
rvTXPROP  odr  0.0076110  0.0036958  2.06  1.98% *** 
  lls  0.0056863  0.0012133  4.69  0.00% *** 
rvTRFtot  odr  0.0163649  0.0051305  3.19  0.07% *** 
  lls  -0.0035224  0.0019897  -1.77  3.84% ** 
rvTRFedu  odr  0.1434074  0.0198415  7.23  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0135373  0.0073900  1.83  3.36% ** 
rvTRFhwy  odr  0.0096521  0.0134350  0.72  23.63%  
  lls  0.0019826  0.0048001  0.41  33.98%  
spEDUtot  odr  -0.0249903  0.0037683  -6.63  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0061459  0.0014506  -4.24  0.00% *** 
spHWYtot  odr  -0.0392720  0.0134587  -2.92  0.18% *** 
  lls  -0.0189576  0.0041434  -4.58  0.00% *** 
spWELtot  odr  -0.0143939  0.0050963  -2.82  0.24% *** 
  lls  0.0004317  0.0021893  0.20  42.19%  
spCAPhwy  odr  0.0099874  0.0159443  0.63  26.56%  
  lls  0.0176750  0.0052652  3.36  0.04% *** 42 
 
 Table A4:  Regression D, continued (per capita; 1959 – 1997) 










dmPOLgov  odr  -0.0010235  0.0007508  -1.36  8.65% * 
  lls  -0.0016824  0.0003849  -4.37  0.00% *** 
dmTXref  odr  -0.0015992  0.0010437  -1.53  6.28% * 
  lls  -0.0010759  0.0004708  -2.29  1.12% *** 
dmTXsvl  odr  -0.0001107  0.0000693  -1.60  5.53% * 
  lls  -0.0000242  0.0000197  -1.23  11.01%  
dmPOP  odr  -0.0002824  0.0001148  -2.46  0.70% *** 
  lls  -0.0001299  0.0000274  -4.75  0.00% *** 
dmDEN  odr  -0.0011047  0.0002829  -3.90  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0004231  0.0000603  -7.02  0.00% *** 
dmWAGEcv  odr  0.0154413  0.0102397  1.51  6.59% * 
  lls  -0.0165814  0.0034684  -4.78  0.00% *** 
dmPRNFPcv  odr  -0.0071238  0.0032788  -2.17  1.50% *** 
  lls  -0.0015837  0.0007087  -2.23  1.28% *** 
geHEtotP  odr  -0.2951371  0.0972264  -3.04  0.12% *** 
  lls  -0.1513898  0.0210277  -7.20  0.00% *** 
geSIZ  odr  0.0000054  0.0000115  0.47  31.86%  
  lls  -0.0000050  0.0000023  -2.15  1.57% *** 
geSIZPf  odr  -0.0000626  0.0000254  -2.46  0.70% *** 
  lls  -0.0000201  0.0000057  -3.54  0.02% *** 
geREGatl  odr  0.0013876  0.0009819  1.41  7.89% * 
  lls  0.0007583  0.0001852  4.09  0.00% *** 
geREGpac  odr  -0.0027652  0.0015502  -1.78  3.73% ** 
  lls  0.0011817  0.0003036  3.89  0.01% *** 
gePOLCgov  odr  0.0001881  0.0001157  1.62  5.22% * 
  lls  0.0000565  0.0000213  2.65  0.41% *** 
R
2  odr  99.9         
lls  97.9         
ℓ(∙)  odr  -9712.0         
lls  -11845.7         
σε 
odr  161.2         
nls  788.3         
lls  0.0         
σε
y 
odr  163.1         
lls  na         
σε
yt0 
odr  49.5         
lls  na         
σε
γ 
odr  0.00857         
lls  na         
***   indicates H0 is rejected at α = 5% significance level. 
**    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 10% significance level. 
*    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 20% significance level. 
a  ℓ(∙) denotes the value of the likehood function.  [σε , σεy , σεyt0 , σγ] denotes the standard 
deviations of the estimated residuals, the measurement error of income, the measurement error for 
initial income y0 , and the model, respectively; the standard deviation σε is a weighted average of the 
measurement error standard deviations and the model standard deviation. 43 
 
Table A5:  Regression E (per capita; 1959 – 1997)
a 










usGRW  odr  0.8941966  0.0259472  34.46  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.7882297  0.0447913  17.60  0.00% *** 
usINF  odr  -0.0006625  0.0001581  -4.19  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0000764  0.0001154  0.66  25.39%  
usFUELpp  odr  -0.0024169  0.0003768  -6.42  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0006407  0.0003391  -1.89  2.95% ** 
geREGcon  odr  0.0241684  0.0052393  4.61  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0313777  0.0019052  16.47  0.00% *** 
gePOLstate  odr  0.0029203  0.0007982  3.66  0.01% *** 
  lls  0.0014977  0.0001815  8.25  0.00% *** 
y0  odr  0.0006289  0.0003001  2.10  1.81% *** 
  lls  -0.0019079  0.0000901  -21.18  0.00% *** 
rho  odr  0.0125412  0.0022004  5.70  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0038473  0.0009959  3.86  0.01% *** 
rvTXTOTAL  odr  0.0033259  0.0025739  1.29  9.82% * 
  lls  0.0096244  0.0012998  7.40  0.00% *** 
rvTXINCcor  odr  0.0191038  0.0092603  2.06  1.96% *** 
  lls  0.0148150  0.0032494  4.56  0.00% *** 
rvTXINCind  odr  0.0061610  0.0028659  2.15  1.59% *** 
  lls  -0.0058435  0.0011023  -5.30  0.00% *** 
rvTXSALgen  odr  0.0085303  0.0032497  2.62  0.44% *** 
  lls  -0.0063593  0.0011902  -5.34  0.00% *** 
rvTXPROP  odr  0.0058981  0.0030853  1.91  2.81% ** 
  lls  0.0056219  0.0011968  4.70  0.00% *** 
rvTRFtot  odr  0.0194984  0.0042902  4.54  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0121337  0.0020793  -5.84  0.00% *** 
rvTRFedu  odr  0.1102266  0.0165482  6.66  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0231872  0.0070103  3.31  0.05% *** 
rvTRFhwy  odr  0.0152703  0.0115671  1.32  9.35% * 
  lls  0.0505584  0.0056351  8.97  0.00% *** 
spEDUtot  odr  -0.0239896  0.0031166  -7.70  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0073666  0.0013638  -5.40  0.00% *** 
spHWYtot  odr  -0.0392916  0.0116252  -3.38  0.04% *** 
  lls  -0.0438618  0.0044079  -9.95  0.00% *** 
spWELtot  odr  -0.0158056  0.0041751  -3.79  0.01% *** 
  lls  0.0011201  0.0020451  0.55  29.20%  
spCAPhwy  odr  0.0023492  0.0133271  0.18  43.01%  
  lls  0.0241478  0.0049008  4.93  0.00% *** 44 
 
 Table A5:  Regression E, continued (per capita; 1959 – 1997) 










dmPOLgov  odr  -0.0010039  0.0006423  -1.56  5.91% * 
  lls  -0.0025221  0.0004092  -6.16  0.00% *** 
dmTXref  odr  -0.0020151  0.0008639  -2.33  0.99% *** 
  lls  -0.0021147  0.0004412  -4.79  0.00% *** 
dmTXsvl  odr  -0.0000889  0.0000602  -1.48  7.02% * 
  lls  -0.0000064  0.0000189  -0.34  36.81%  
dmPOP  odr  -0.0003357  0.0000947  -3.55  0.02% *** 
  lls  -0.0002163  0.0000256  -8.46  0.00% *** 
dmDEN  odr  -0.0010525  0.0002390  -4.40  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0005401  0.0000630  -8.57  0.00% *** 
dmWAGEcv  odr  0.0168584  0.0085853  1.96  2.49% *** 
  lls  -0.0017786  0.0036264  -0.49  31.19%  
dmPRNFPcv  odr  -0.0074348  0.0027768  -2.68  0.37% *** 
  lls  -0.0023562  0.0006987  -3.37  0.04% *** 
geHEtotP  odr  -0.2687828  0.0783004  -3.43  0.03% *** 
  lls  -0.1821162  0.0197325  -9.23  0.00% *** 
geSIZ  odr  0.0000150  0.0000101  1.49  6.78% * 
  lls  0.0000020  0.0000023  0.88  18.89%  
geSIZPf  odr  -0.0000631  0.0000218  -2.90  0.19% *** 
  lls  -0.0000630  0.0000061  -10.36  0.00% *** 
geREGatl  odr  0.0015145  0.0008066  1.88  3.03% ** 
  lls  0.0004304  0.0001724  2.50  0.63% *** 
geREGpac  odr  -0.0022791  0.0012560  -1.81  3.49% ** 
  lls  0.0022308  0.0002926  7.62  0.00% *** 
gePOLCgov  odr  0.0001719  0.0001023  1.68  4.65% ** 
  lls  -0.0000013  0.0000226  -0.06  47.74%  
R
2  odr  99.9         
lls  98.3         
ℓ(∙)  odr  -8325.9         
lls  -10468.1         
σε 
odr  108.2         
nls  723.2         
lls  0.0         
σε
y 
odr  109.4         
lls  na         
σε
yt0 
odr  48.3         
lls  na         
σε
γ 
odr  0.00761         
lls  na         
***   indicates H0 is rejected at α = 5% significance level. 
**    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 10% significance level. 
*    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 20% significance level. 
a  ℓ(∙) denotes the value of the likehood function.  [σε , σεy , σεyt0 , σγ] denotes the standard 
deviations of the estimated residuals, the measurement error of income, the measurement error for 
initial income y0 , and the model, respectively; the standard deviation σε is a weighted average of the 
measurement error standard deviations and the model standard deviation. 45 
 
Table A6:  Regression F (per capita; 1977 – 1997)
a 










usGRW  odr  0.8376702  0.0349663  23.96  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.8512821  0.0598304  14.23  0.00% *** 
usINF  odr  -0.0014890  0.0002419  -6.16  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0004682  0.0001943  -2.41  0.81% *** 
usFUELpp  odr  -0.0038336  0.0005868  -6.53  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0024630  0.0006297  -3.91  0.00% *** 
geREGcon  odr  -0.0016251  0.0096351  -0.17  43.31%  
  lls  0.0191752  0.0036605  5.24  0.00% *** 
gePOLstate  odr  0.0077262  0.0011849  6.52  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0056481  0.0003525  16.02  0.00% *** 
y0  odr  0.0042018  0.0004824  8.71  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0009721  0.0002343  4.15  0.00% *** 
rho  odr  0.0133331  0.0018369  7.26  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0128239  0.0012559  10.21  0.00% *** 
rvTXTOTAL  odr  -0.0122890  0.0035545  -3.46  0.03% *** 
  lls  -0.0033020  0.0019240  -1.72  4.33% ** 
rvTXINCcor  odr  0.0144542  0.0118043  1.22  11.06%  
  lls  0.0161289  0.0047851  3.37  0.04% *** 
rvTXINCind  odr  0.0124757  0.0035013  3.56  0.02% *** 
  lls  0.0039419  0.0013969  2.82  0.24% *** 
rvTXSALgen  odr  0.0161361  0.0044950  3.59  0.02% *** 
  lls  0.0078923  0.0018746  4.21  0.00% *** 
rvTXPROP  odr  0.0095557  0.0043592  2.19  1.43% *** 
  lls  -0.0003816  0.0019071  -0.20  42.07%  
rvTRFtot  odr  0.0362070  0.0052005  6.96  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0031477  0.0026302  1.20  11.59%  
rvTRFedu  odr  0.0928111  0.0263119  3.53  0.02% *** 
  lls  0.0185087  0.0135811  1.36  8.67% * 
rvTRFhwy  odr  -0.0698818  0.0204263  -3.42  0.03% *** 
  lls  -0.0329248  0.0103197  -3.19  0.07% *** 
spEDUtot  odr  -0.0234398  0.0043689  -5.37  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0067020  0.0021507  -3.12  0.09% *** 
spHWYtot  odr  -0.0029209  0.0155761  -0.19  42.56%  
  lls  0.0479920  0.0081786  5.87  0.00% *** 
spWELtot  odr  -0.0171348  0.0052951  -3.24  0.06% *** 
  lls  -0.0012613  0.0031669  -0.40  34.53%  
spCAPhwy  odr  -0.0395652  0.0170140  -2.33  1.02% *** 
  lls  -0.0761338  0.0073646  -10.34  0.00% *** 46 
 
 Table A6:  Regression F, continued (per capita; 1977 – 1997) 










dmPOLgov  odr  -0.0017111  0.0008823  -1.94  2.64% ** 
  lls  -0.0007516  0.0005810  -1.29  9.81% * 
dmTXref  odr  -0.0028185  0.0010270  -2.74  0.31% *** 
  lls  -0.0009378  0.0004808  -1.95  2.57% ** 
dmTXsvl  odr  0.0000372  0.0001121  0.33  37.00%  
  lls  -0.0000658  0.0000448  -1.47  7.09% * 
dmPOP  odr  -0.0005841  0.0001388  -4.21  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0003146  0.0000591  -5.33  0.00% *** 
dmDEN  odr  -0.0010891  0.0003317  -3.28  0.05% *** 
  lls  0.0001125  0.0001294  0.87  19.24%  
dmWAGEcv  odr  -0.0031714  0.0143935  -0.22  41.28%  
  lls  -0.0152187  0.0073483  -2.07  1.93% *** 
dmPRNFPcv  odr  -0.0278520  0.0062530  -4.45  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0140347  0.0025069  -5.60  0.00% *** 
geHEtotP  odr  -0.0160173  0.1250571  -0.13  44.91%  
  lls  0.0092005  0.0421378  0.22  41.36%  
geSIZ  odr  0.0000145  0.0000166  0.87  19.11%  
  lls  0.0000114  0.0000058  1.96  2.55% ** 
geSIZPf  odr  0.0000267  0.0000324  0.83  20.47%  
  lls  0.0000049  0.0000123  0.40  34.57%  
geREGatl  odr  0.0041014  0.0011744  3.49  0.03% *** 
  lls  0.0042574  0.0004006  10.63  0.00% *** 
geREGpac  odr  -0.0081298  0.0020384  -3.99  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0020239  0.0007513  -2.69  0.36% *** 
gePOLCgov  odr  0.0004209  0.0001793  2.35  0.96% *** 
  lls  -0.0000669  0.0000583  -1.15  12.60%  
R
2  odr  99.9         
lls  97.3         
ℓ(∙)  odr  -4257.8         
lls  -5270.8         
σε 
odr  103.6         
nls  638.6         
lls  0.0         
σε
y 
odr  105.9         
lls  na         
σε
yt0 
odr  42.8         
lls  na         
σε
γ 
odr  0.00751         
lls  na         
***   indicates H0 is rejected at α = 5% significance level. 
**    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 10% significance level. 
*    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 20% significance level. 
a  ℓ(∙) denotes the value of the likehood function.  [σε , σεy , σεyt0 , σγ] denotes the standard 
deviations of the estimated residuals, the measurement error of income, the measurement error for 
initial income y0 , and the model, respectively; the standard deviation σε is a weighted average of the 
measurement error standard deviations and the model standard deviation. 47 
 
Table A7:  Regression G (per capita; 1977 – 1997)
a 










usGRW  odr  0.7989961  0.0352967  22.64  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.8324204  0.0596820  13.95  0.00% *** 
usINF  odr  -0.0021219  0.0002624  -8.09  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0008248  0.0002053  -4.02  0.00% *** 
usFUELpp  odr  -0.0047349  0.0005882  -8.05  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0028951  0.0006325  -4.58  0.00% *** 
geREGcon  odr  -0.0097169  0.0101706  -0.96  16.98%  
  lls  0.0143514  0.0039682  3.62  0.02% *** 
gePOLstate  odr  0.0077890  0.0012074  6.45  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0057615  0.0003665  15.72  0.00% *** 
y0  odr  0.0043527  0.0004827  9.02  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0015187  0.0002343  6.48  0.00% *** 
rho  odr  0.0139456  0.0018323  7.61  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0125494  0.0012713  9.87  0.00% *** 
rvTXTOTAL  odr  -0.0206724  0.0044311  -4.67  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0075909  0.0022035  -3.44  0.03% *** 
rvTXINCcor  odr  0.0273090  0.0114102  2.39  0.85% *** 
  lls  0.0175358  0.0047313  3.71  0.01% *** 
rvTXINCind  odr  0.0126408  0.0037352  3.38  0.04% *** 
  lls  0.0039828  0.0015809  2.52  0.60% *** 
rvTXSALgen  odr  0.0164256  0.0043098  3.81  0.01% *** 
  lls  0.0067224  0.0018590  3.62  0.02% *** 
rvTXPROP  odr  0.0211796  0.0048458  4.37  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0062094  0.0018675  3.32  0.05% *** 
rvTRFtot  odr  0.0346173  0.0046416  7.46  0.00% *** 
  lls  0.0081549  0.0024853  3.28  0.05% *** 
rvTRFedu  odr  0.0547823  0.0221364  2.47  0.68% *** 
  lls  0.0099688  0.0108490  0.92  17.92%  
rvTRFhwy  odr  -0.0589587  0.0197869  -2.98  0.15% *** 
  lls  -0.0327695  0.0096035  -3.41  0.03% *** 
spEDUtot  odr  -0.0206737  0.0042895  -4.82  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0078351  0.0021376  -3.67  0.01% *** 
spHWYtot  odr  0.0033760  0.0154022  0.22  41.33%  
  lls  0.0438999  0.0079969  5.49  0.00% *** 
spWELtot  odr  -0.0153604  0.0050789  -3.02  0.13% *** 
  lls  -0.0014188  0.0029730  -0.48  31.67%  
spCAPhwy  odr  -0.0491790  0.0167717  -2.93  0.17% *** 
  lls  -0.0783616  0.0072578  -10.80  0.00% *** 48 
 
 Table A7:  Regression G, continued (per capita; 1977 – 1997) 










dmPOLgov  odr  -0.0014138  0.0008758  -1.61  5.34% * 
  lls  -0.0004223  0.0005660  -0.75  22.79%  
dmTXref  odr  -0.0030315  0.0010073  -3.01  0.13% *** 
  lls  -0.0013786  0.0004681  -2.95  0.17% *** 
dmTXsvl  odr  0.0002713  0.0000952  2.85  0.22% *** 
  lls  0.0000731  0.0000348  2.10  1.79% *** 
dmPOP  odr  -0.0006322  0.0001390  -4.55  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0003765  0.0000566  -6.65  0.00% *** 
dmDEN  odr  -0.0011308  0.0003329  -3.40  0.04% *** 
  lls  -0.0000422  0.0001288  -0.33  37.17%  
dmWAGEcv  odr  -0.0127627  0.0144083  -0.89  18.80%  
  lls  -0.0256473  0.0070387  -3.64  0.01% *** 
dmPRNFPcv  odr  -0.0265801  0.0062039  -4.28  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0170890  0.0025164  -6.79  0.00% *** 
geHEtotP  odr  -0.0110668  0.1237472  -0.09  46.44%  
  lls  -0.0019649  0.0416799  -0.05  48.12%  
geSIZ  odr  0.0000182  0.0000167  1.09  13.79%  
  lls  0.0000138  0.0000058  2.37  0.90% *** 
geSIZPf  odr  0.0000338  0.0000324  1.04  14.89%  
  lls  0.0000172  0.0000124  1.38  8.42% * 
geREGatl  odr  0.0044051  0.0011685  3.77  0.01% *** 
  lls  0.0041443  0.0003931  10.54  0.00% *** 
geREGpac  odr  -0.0089170  0.0020430  -4.36  0.00% *** 
  lls  -0.0032424  0.0007670  -4.23  0.00% *** 
gePOLCgov  odr  0.0004479  0.0001823  2.46  0.71% *** 
  lls  -0.0000060  0.0000606  -0.10  46.09%  
R
2  odr  99.9         
lls  97.3         
ℓ(∙)  odr  -4255.6         
lls  -5265.6         
σε 
odr  104.4         
nls  634.6         
lls  0.0         
σε
y 
odr  106.7         
lls  na         
σε
yt0 
odr  43.3         
lls  na         
σε
γ 
odr  0.00745         
lls  Na         
***   indicates H0 is rejected at α = 5% significance level. 
**    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 10% significance level. 
*    indicates H0 is rejected at α = 20% significance level. 
a  ℓ(∙) denotes the value of the likehood function.  [σε , σεy , σεyt0 , σγ] denotes the standard 
deviations of the estimated residuals, the measurement error of income, the measurement error for 
initial income y0 , and the model, respectively; the standard deviation σε is a weighted average of the 
measurement error standard deviations and the model standard deviation. 